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1. Ownership, competition and regulation 
 
The UK regulatory framework developed in the 1980s was intended to improve on the 
restrictive, inefficient and burdensome US regulatory approach. Over subsequent years, UK 
utility regulation has a number of achievements to its credit. Privatisation, the promotion of 
competition and the imaginative use of incentive price caps have generally led to greater 
efficiency, price reductions and improved quality of service. However, the regulatory process 
has become increasingly burdensome and there are growing doubts as to how well it protects 
customers.  
 
Meanwhile, utilities and customer groups in the US and Canada, encouraged by some 
regulators, have developed methods of negotiating and settling regulatory issues that more 
directly reflect the interests of customers, often embody incentive price caps as in the UK, and 
avoid unduly burdensome regulatory processes. There is now scope for UK regulators to learn 
from overseas. This paper summarises these developments. It then examines how three UK 
utility regulators – the CAA, Ofgem and Ofwat - are responding to them. 
 
2. The US regulatory framework 
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When the UK began to privatise its utilities, it looked at how the US regulated its privately 
owned utilities. The regulator approved price increases only if they provided a “just and 
reasonable return” on investment that was “used and useful”. The regulator could step in at 
any time to seek price reductions whenever a company seemed to be making excessive 
profits.  
 
All this might seem reasonable. However, closer examination by economists suggested at 
several reservations.  
 
First, this was too much like a ‘cost-plus’ arrangement. There was little incentive for utilities 
to reduce costs if the savings had to be immediately passed on to customers. There was in fact 
an incentive to ‘gold-plate’ or ‘pad the rate base’. Also, in setting prices the US framework 
was backward-looking rather than forward-looking. It looked only at ‘facts’ about actual 
expenses in a ‘test year’. The regulator could not make judgements about the scope for future 
efficiency improvements or the need for future capital expenditure. This seemed a serious 
limitation at a time when increasing the efficiency of the hitherto nationalised  industries was 
a key aim of policy in the UK. 
 
Second, in many industries like airlines, telecoms and energy, US regulators enforced barriers 
to entry that maintained a monopoly and prevented competition. Customers were denied the 
protection that competition could provide against inefficient production techniques and 
misinvestment, against excessive prices and lack of innovation, and against regulators that 
might be unable or unwilling to act in the interests of customers.  
 
Third, the US legal framework and litigation process seemed unduly bureaucratic and 
legalistic. Rate cases could take years to resolve, in some cases many years. This was time-
consuming, expensive, inflexible and not conducive to the rapid modernisation that was 
needed in the UK.  
 
3. The UK regulatory framework 
 
In 1982, the Secretary of State for Industry, Patrick Jenkin, had the task to privatise British 
Telecom. He needed to reassure investors and customers so as to attract very considerable 
new investment into this rapidly changing sector. He was also conscious of the limitations of 
US regulation. He wanted something more flexible and evolutionary. He specified that British 
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Telecom should be regulated ‘with a light rein’. For present purposes, the UK regulatory 
framework that was designed to meet this aim had three main elements. 
 
First, the regulator was to allow and indeed promote competition wherever possible. This 
would give customers a choice and stimulate companies to greater efficiency and innovation. 
Second, where competition was not possible or not economic, an RPI-X incentive price cap 
was a simpler and more effective form of regulation than US rate of return control. Set for a 
fixed-term, it offered a greater incentive for the company to become more efficient and reduce 
its costs. Requiring prices not to exceed the rate of inflation less an ‘X factor’ provided 
assurance to customers and company alike. As efficiency improved, customers would benefit 
from further price reductions over successive price control periods. The price cap was simple 
to explain, and hopefully would be simple to set. The third element was the ability of the 
regulator and utility simply to agree a modification to the licence conditions (e.g a new price 
control) without the need for formal and adversarial legal proceedings. The regulator had the 
ability to refer the issue to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (later the Competition 
Commission) if the utility declined to accept a modification proposed by the regulator. 
 
4. UK regulation in practice 
 
In the event, with a few exceptions, the novel UK policy turned out remarkably well 
throughout the privatised and regulated sector. The regulators have generally promoted 
competition both actively and effectively. This is less so in the water sector, but there is some 
scepticism about the scope for competition there, and Ofwat has been faced with an 
unenthusiastic series of ministers. 
 
The record on removing price controls as competition develops has been mixed. Offer, Ofgas 
and Ofgem removed the controls on domestic gas and electricity prices within at most four 
years of opening those markets. In contrast, Oftel (later Ofcom) took some 22 years to remove 
the initial RPI-X price control on BT’s retail prices. International comparisons (at least in 
electricity) suggest that those countries that have maintained price controls have thereby 
discouraged competition. The low point in the record must be the Government’s overruling of 
the recommendation of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to remove Stansted Airport’s 
price control on the grounds that the Airport might have market power in future. 
 
RPI-X price controls have generally provided very effective incentives. Operating costs have 
significantly reduced, and efficiency has improved. There has been very substantial capital 
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expenditure. Prices are generally lower, or at least lower than they would have been in the 
absence of these changes. Quality of service is higher. There has been innovation in 
techniques and in products. 
 
Yet the UK approach, for all its advantages and potential flexibility, seems to have limitations 
in terms of process. The price control review process is especially and increasingly 
burdensome. Initially it took about a year, now it takes about three years - to set a five year 
control. The total length of regulatory documents issued during the price control review of the 
electricity distribution companies increased from about 250 pages when I did the first review 
in 1995, to about 500 pages in 2000, to about 2000 pages in 2005. A colleague has estimated 
that the length may have been about 3-4000 pages in 2010 – at least a twelve-fold increase. It 
has been said that the volume of annual information required by Ofwat increased tenfold 
between 2000 and 2010.2 
 
The regulatory process is also intrusive and often a cause of conflict between companies, 
customers and regulators within each industry. There is minimal role for users and customers. 
Regulators are increasingly required to specify or approve quality of service standards and 
investment programmes on the basis of limited knowledge about customer preferences. The 
pressure for regulatory uniformity limits the ability to tailor regulation to particular 
circumstances. There is less innovation, less learning from experience, than one would expect 
in a competitive market. 
 
Indeed, the burden of the typical UK approach is now so great that it rivals the burden of the 
US approach in the 1970s that we sought to avoid. If we had seen present UK regulation in 
action then, I suspect we should have been equally keen to avoid it.  
 
5. Alternative approaches 
 
Why has UK regulation run into such problems? The initial RPI-X regimes put a cap on the 
prices that the companies could charge, but left efficiency improvements and investment and 
innovation to the companies themselves. Increasingly, however, regulators have sought to 
specify in advance what levels and kinds of efficiency improvements, investment 
programmes and innovation could or should take place. Partly this is in response to tougher 
arguments from the companies, partly to avoid setting targets that seem to be too easily met. 
                                                 
2 David Gray giving evidence to the All Party Parliamentary Water Group, Utility Week, 9 
February 2011. 
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But how can regulators know what companies can achieve, and what customers want? In 
order to specify the desired outcomes, regulators have gradually taken upon themselves the 
discovery process traditionally undertaken by the competitive market. This is proving to be an 
increasingly challenging task. 
 
Are there different and better ways of regulating? Since stepping down as electricity 
regulator, I have been exploring how regulation actually works in other jurisdictions, not least 
in the US and Canada. As in the UK, there has been greater focus on competition than in the 
past. Where there is no competition, the formal regulatory framework there has not changed 
much. However, in many jurisdictions the parties have nonetheless found ways to reduce or 
avoid the previous regulatory burden. Moreover, utilities and customers have secured 
outcomes that they themselves perceive as better than what the formal regulatory process 
would have delivered. 
 
The key to this development has been the active involvement of the users and customers 
themselves, and/or their representatives, in negotiations with the regulated utility. The 
regulatory body no longer sees its role as taking all the decisions itself. Rather, its role is to 
facilitate discussion, negotiation and if possible agreement among the interested parties. The 
price control decision reverts to the regulator in the event that the parties fail to agree.  
 
The ability of customers to call on the regulator, if necessary, to determine the price (and 
other terms) in effect removes the utility’s ability to exercise monopoly power over its 
customers. The focus is therefore on discovering and providing what customers want at an 
acceptable price. The regulator thereby facilitates the market discovery process, even in the 
absence of competition. This obviates or reduces the need for a burdensome discovery 
process by the regulator itself. 
 
6. Negotiated settlements in the US and Canada 
 
In the US, negotiated settlements were pioneered by the Federal Power Commission (FPC). 
Following a Supreme Court decision that extended regulatory jurisdiction from 157 natural 
gas companies to 4365 independent producers, the FPC was suddenly faced with thousands of 
pipeline rate cases. In 1960 it was estimated that, even with tripled staff, the FPC would take 
at least 82 years to deal with the 3200 rate applications then filed.  
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As a means of coping with this backlog, the FPC encouraged settlements between the 
pipelines and their users. Users of interstate pipelines would typically be oil and gas 
producers, shippers and marketers, perhaps some generating stations, a few large final 
customers, and other interested parties including State Public Utility Commissions on behalf 
of smaller customers. The FPC’s successor body, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), continued this policy. By 1980 settlements were reached in approximately two-thirds 
of all electric rate cases there, and in 1986 in over 70% of gas pipeline rate cases. Presently, 
no less than 90% of the rate cases at FERC are settled by the participants rather than 
determined by the Commission through the conventional litigation process. 
 
There have been similar developments in some other parts of the US and in Canada. (Doucet 
and Littlechild 2006, Littlechild 2008a,b) The regulatory commissions have varied in their 
stance: some have been sceptical but most have been more sympathetic. The Florida Public 
Service Commission (FPSC) has accepted and indeed encouraged settlements. (Littlechild 
2009a,b) Negotiations have generally been led by the Office of Public Counsel, whose duty is 
to protect the interests of customers. In Canada, too, the National Energy Board (NEB) has 
explicitly encouraged the parties to settle. (Doucet and Littlechild 2009) To facilitate 
agreement on one of the most difficult issues, the NEB initially set out annually how it would 
determine the cost of capital in the event that a rate change was referred to it.  
 
In both these jurisdictions, settlement discussions have generally taken place independently of 
the regulatory commission (FPSC or NEB). In contrast, FERC Trial Staff play an active role 
in facilitating negotiation and settlement. (Littlechild 2011) 3 months after a pipeline files for 
a new tariff, Trial Staff analyse it and propose a first settlement offer. Trial Staff then lead 
discussions among the interested parties with a view to finding a mutually acceptable tariff. In 
recent years, agreement in principle has been reached in a median time of 2 ½ months after 
Trial Staff’s first settlement offer, just before testimony would otherwise need to have been 
filed. Typically it takes a further 2 ½ months for the parties to finalise the wording of the 
settlement and to obtain the judge’s certification that it is uncontested. It then takes about 3 
months for FERC formally to approve it. This stands in contrast to litigated rate cases that 
typically take many years to conclude. 
 
In other words, although the formal regulatory framework in the US may be as burdensome as 
it ever was, the parties have found a more effective way of operating within this framework. 
User groups and utilities have negotiated settlements of rates, and often other relevant issues 
such as investment and quality of service. Generally they do so by focusing on the main 
features of the control, including the ‘bottom line’, without having to agree in detail each 
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input into the calculation. Such negotiations have not only been less time-consuming, less 
costly and less uncertain than litigation. They have also been more flexible, more innovative 
and more closely tailored to the needs of particular users and customers. They have been the 
means of introducing significant price reductions, a series of fixed-term efficiency incentive 
programmes, and many other features over the last two decades. These settlements have thus 
introduced variants of the RPI-X incentive price caps that characterise UK regulation, and 
that improve on traditional US rate of return control.  
 
In addition, the development of settlement processes has been associated with improvements 
in information provision and understanding within the industries, and better relationships 
between utilities and customers. In sum, both the process and the substance of these 
negotiated settlements better meet the needs of the parties than the approach and solutions 
determined by the regulatory commissions. 
 
7. The CAA’s constructive engagement  
 
How have UK regulators responded to the growing concerns about burdensome regulatory 
processes and the question as to whether the process delivers the outcomes that customers 
really want? We may compare the policies of three of these regulators. 
 
The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) has made a limited but significant move in the direction 
of greater customer involvement and negotiated settlements, although perhaps not consciously 
copying the US approach. In response to dissatisfaction with previous price control processes, 
including concerns of the regulatory body itself, the CAA invited the airports and airlines to 
take forward some of the work usually carried out by the regulator, under a process of 
“constructive engagement”. (CAA 2005)  The specified work included traffic forecasts, 
quality of service requirements, and investment programmes. The CAA would retain 
responsibility for assessing operating costs, cost of capital and the final price control. It would 
ensure that the interests of passengers and future airlines were safeguarded, and would retain 
final responsibility for decisions. “But if an agreement can be better reached by the parties, 
the regulator is likely to have a preference for it.” 
 
The CAA considers that the outcome was generally satisfactory at Heathrow and Gatwick. 
Several broad agreements were reached. There was also an improvement in consultation and 
regulatory discourse. (Bush 2007) 
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The Competition Commission (2007) was more critical, though it was also critical of BAA’s 
own planning procedures.3 It was particularly concerned about significant increases in BAA’s 
capex programme during its inquiry, about information and resource asymmetries, and the 
absence of a dispute resolution or arbitration procedure at each stage. Nevertheless, the 
Commission saw substantial merits in the constructive engagement process, noted that the 
airlines did too, and concluded that constructive engagement should be an ongoing process. 
When the Competition Commission was faced with the task of recommending a price control 
for Stansted, it decided to resurrect the constructive engagement approach. With the 
controversial issue of a new runway now deferred, the parties were able to reach agreement. 
 
The CAA accepted that that there was scope for improvement in future. It put in place 
arrangements to provide for ongoing constructive engagement. It also adopted what it called a 
customer consultation approach in setting the price controls for national air traffic services 
(NATS). (CAA 2008) The new process reflected learning from the experience with the airport 
price control reviews. For example, the process specified more explicitly what was expected 
of the parties, including the process of interaction and the obligations and timetable for 
providing information. The consultation process was managed by a Customer Consultation 
Working Group (CCWG). It incorporated some new elements, notably in accommodating the 
interests of many smaller users. It widened the potential role of the engagement process, for 
example to propose incentive mechanisms.  
 
This customer consultation approach proceeded smoothly and on time to a successful 
conclusion. Most stakeholders then indicated that they would like the process for the next 
airport price control process to build upon the NATS process. None suggested a reversion to 
the previous price control review process. (CAA 2010, paras 3.6, 3.7) Later, given the 
uncertainty surrounding the Government’s new legislation on economic regulation, the CAA 
invited the parties to agree a one-year extension of the previous controls. Heathrow agreed 
with its airlines a cap for its capital expenditure programme; Gatwick agreed with its airlines 
a more comprehensive negotiated settlement, involving a tightening of the price cap from 
RPI+2 to RPI-0.5, in exchange for a new set of capital expenditure triggers. (CAA 2011 p. 6) 
CAA and the parties are now exploring a more enhanced negotiated settlements approach for 
the 2013-18 price control period. 4 
 
 
                                                 
3 Former BAA executive Mike Toms (2008) also expressed a critical view of the process. 
4 Australia and some states in Germany have also moved towards negotiated settlements 
between airports and airlines.  (Littlechild 2011b,c)  
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8. Ofgem’s RPI-X@20 Review 
 
Ofgem has noted the achievements of the traditional UK regulatory approach but has also 
acknowledged some of the problems. Its RPI-X@20 Review extensively explored alternative 
approaches. (Buchanan 2005, 2008a,b) It accepted the case for an ‘enhanced engagement’ 
model, whereby customers, users and networks would engage in more discussion, and 
stakeholders would be given greater opportunities to influence Ofgem and network company 
decision-making. (Ofgem 2010a) The regulator was anxious not to be prescriptive, and 
companies would be encouraged to engage with stakeholders in a wide variety of ways, 
including on the development of their business plans. (Ofgem 2010b) 
 
However, Ofgem concluded against moving towards negotiated settlement or constructive 
engagement. Its basic reason was that customer groups would be unwilling or unable 
adequately to reflect the interests of present and future customers. 
 
We do not think it is appropriate to delegate responsibility for agreement of network 
regulatory decisions to consumer representatives, network users or other parties. We have 
concerns that the interests of these parties are not sufficiently aligned, with those of final 
consumers (existing and future), to delegate primary responsibility to them to agree regulatory 
decisions. It is also not clear which body would be able to represent the interests of future 
consumers. While consumer representatives may be better placed to perform this role, we 
recognise that it is extremely difficult to develop a sufficiently full understanding of the 
diversity of consumer needs and interests to represent the entire consumer view accurately to 
make trade-offs between, what may be, competing views from different groups of customers. 
As such, consumer representatives may not be able to add value in assuming responsibility for 
agreement of regulatory decisions over and above the role that we currently play. We also 
have concerns regarding their current access to resources, the current levels of expertise of all 
but a very small number of individual consumer representatives and their appetite to engage in 
this way. (Ofgem 2009, para 5.2) 
 
It is not as if there are no existing bodies that represent UK energy customers.  For example, 
the Major Energy Users Council is supported by many energy-using companies, and there are 
other such groups. Chambers of Commerce represent smaller businesses. The statutory body 
Consumer Focus has a function to represent the views of consumers on consumer matters to 
regulatory bodies like Ofgem. 
 
Would such bodies be properly able to represent customers in a negotiation? Access to 
expertise and resources is of course important. In some North American jurisdictions, the 
regulatory process provides support for participants where the regulatory body judges this 
appropriate. At FERC, Trial Staff provide an important input in proposing a first offer as a 
reasonable basis for settlement, and in being on hand to explain and discuss the issues and 
calculations involved. 
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Is there the “appetite of customer representatives to engage”? Hitherto, UK price control 
processes have not been conducive to customer engagement in this way. Why should 
companies negotiate settlements with customers if the regulatory body would ignore the 
outcomes? But with appropriate encouragement and access to expertise and information, and 
an understanding that arrangements negotiated with utilities would be respected, then 
customer representatives could be as keen to engage in the UK as they have been elsewhere. 
 
Other regulators have certainly been alert to the need to protect those not at the negotiating 
table, including future market participants, but this has not proved an obstacle to encouraging 
customer negotiations. Thus, before approving negotiated settlements, US regulatory bodies 
have to assure themselves that the proposed rates are just and reasonable, and not unduly 
discriminatory or preferential. The negotiating parties therefore bear this in mind – and, if 
necessary, regulatory staff will bring this to their attention. Similarly, the CAA has been 
willing to modify the outcome of negotiations if necessary to protect the interests of those not 
present in the negotiations. It has consistently emphasised that it would be minded to adopt 
agreed outcomes “subject to the CAA’s consideration of the extent to which the results from 
any customer consultation reflected the interests of passengers, cargo shippers and airlines not 
directly represented in such consultation”. (CAA 2008, paras 5.48, 5.49) On this basis, the 
CAA introduced a positive incentive for BAA to improve quality of service, beyond what the 
airlines considered necessary for their own purposes.  
 
It is true that Ofgem has a principal objective “to protect the interests of existing and future 
consumers”. However, the statutes qualify this in various respects.  “The interests of such 
consumers are their interests taken as a whole, including their interests in the reduction of 
greenhouse gases and in the security of the supply of gas and electricity to them.” Ofgem 
must have regard to “the interests of individuals who are disabled or chronically sick, of 
pensionable age, with low incomes, or residing in rural areas”, as well as to “the need to 
secure that licence holders are able to finance the activities which are the subject of 
obligations on them” and “the need to contribute to the achievement of sustainable 
development”. It must “promote efficiency and economy” on the part of licensees. It must 
“secure a diverse and viable long-term energy supply, and … have regard to the effect on the 
environment.” In addition, it must have regard to “certain statutory guidance on social and 
environmental matters issued by the Secretary of State”. 
 
Given the multitude of obligations on Ofgem, not to mention the political and media pressures 
to which any regulatory body is necessarily subject, is such a regulatory body better able to 
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understand and represent the interests of present and future customers than the bodies that 
actually represent present customers? Experience in jurisdictions where negotiated 
settlements are common suggests that customers themselves do not accept this. Nor did the 
UK Competition Commission in the case of airports and airlines.5 Precluding the use of 
negotiated settlements therefore limits the extent to which customers can act to seek the 
outcomes they themselves prefer. It removes a protection, which has developed in the US, 
against the ‘regulator knows best’ philosophy. It seems likely to lead to more investment and 
expenditure, and higher prices, than customers themselves would be willing to choose. It 
remains to be seen whether Ofgem’s proposed ‘enhanced engagement’ model can provide the 
same degree of protection for customers. 
 
Meanwhile, the Government is in course of reviewing Ofgem and Ofwat. Evidence put to its 
review indicates a concern about undue bureaucracy and regulatory burden. The 
Government’s response mentions the scope for learning from regulatory experience overseas. 
(DECC 2010) Surprisingly, it does not mention negotiated settlements.  
 
9. Reviews of regulation in the UK water sector 
 
Regulation in the UK water sector has been - and still is being - extensively reviewed. Many 
issues have been covered, not least competition, where there are divided views but some 
pressure for at least extending retail competition to a larger number of customers. On the 
specific issue of customer involvement, a number of stakeholders and commentators, 
including Walker (2009) and Cave (2010) as authors of recent reviews, have recommended 
introducing more formal constructive engagement.  
 
Similarly, the interim findings of David Gray’s review of Ofwat for Defra seem sympathetic 
to a move towards negotiated settlements, or more generally to a greater role for customers 
and users instead of greater involvement by the regulator. (Gray 2011) ‘Options for consumer 
representation’ and ‘need for major simplification of annual reporting and price control 
process’ are two of five issues to address. It is “clear to all that the regulatory burden has 
increased massively. …Ofwat has committed to reducing the burden, but there is a lack of 
                                                 
5 “We took the view that the airport’s airline customers are generally in a much better position 
than the regulator, the CAA, to suggest what development is needed at the airport, even 
recognising that these interests might, on occasion, diverge from the interests of future airlines 
and passengers, whose interests should also be represented….We considered whether the 
interests of potential new airlines at the airport or passengers might deviate from the interests of 
current airlines in these decisions, but we found no reason to believe that they did.” (Competition 
Commission 2008 paras 23, 24) 
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trust between Ofwat and companies. A major culture change is needed on both sides.” At the 
same time, the review identifies as an argument for retaining CCWater that “the trend towards 
constructive engagement/negotiated settlements seems likely to continue and CCWater is well 
placed to do this”. 
 
CCWater (the Consumer Council for Water) has a statutory role to represent the interests of 
water and sewerage customers, and in doing so to have regard to the interests of specified sets 
of vulnerable customers. It has played an active and constructive role in previous price control 
reviews, not least by encouraging a Quadripartite Working Group process. The judgement 
that it is well placed to participate in a constructive engagement or negotiated settlement 
approach is spot on.  
 
Ofwat’s own view has evolved over time. It explored the implications of this approach, and 
amongst many other inputs invited me to review the literature and experience. In October 
2010 Ofwat described the approach positively, and undertook to consider the matter further. 
(Ofwat 2010) In April 2011 Ofwat declared that “Customer engagement is essential to 
achieve the right outcomes at the right time and at the right price”. (Ofwat 2011) It 
explained at some length that “engagement means understanding what customers want and 
responding to that in plans and ongoing delivery”, that “good engagement with customers can 
legitimise the price setting process” by influencing companies’ plans, helping them to 
demonstrate that they have delivered value for money, ensuring that the price limits represent 
a price and service package that customers and society want and are willing to pay for, and 
much more.  
 
In Ofwat’s view, it is the companies’ responsibility to engage with customers, customers and 
their representatives must be able to challenge the companies’ plans throughout the process, 
and engagement should reflect the particular circumstances of each company. The final 
decision on price limits is nonetheless entrusted to Ofwat. 
 
All this seems encouraging. It is what one would associate with negotiated settlements and 
constructive engagement. Yet Ofwat explicitly rejects these approaches. It says that “the 
process is onerous and requires substantial commitment from any customer or negotiator”. 
This is odd, since these approaches have been adopted elsewhere precisely because they are 
less onerous than the conventional approach. And Ofwat’s expectation of customers’ 
commitment in its own proposed process is nothing if not substantial. 
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Meanwhile, progress is being made elsewhere. The Water Industry Commission for Scotland 
has indicated its intention to base its forthcoming price control review on a process of 
customer negotiation with Scottish Water. (Sutherland 2010) This approach is currently being 
implemented, with the active involvement of Waterwatch Scotland on behalf of customers. 
 
10. Conclusions 
 
UK utility regulation, based on competition and the RPI-X incentive price cap, was designed 
to protect customers and to operate ‘with a light rein’, certainly with a lighter rein than utility 
regulation in the US. In many respects UK regulation has delivered excellent results, but it 
has become transformed into ‘heavy handed regulation’, just as heavy if not heavier than in 
the US.  
 
Meanwhile, regulators, utilities, customer groups and other interested parties in the US have 
discovered a practical way around the legal bureaucracy. Utilities are encouraged to discuss 
their proposals with market participants. The aim is to understand the products and 
investment programmes required by customers, and the costs of delivering the required goods 
and services, with a view to agreeing prices instead of requiring an expensive, time-
consuming and uncertain regulatory procedure. The regulator stands by to determine the 
outcome if the parties fail to agree, and this is a factor that encourages rational discussion and 
agreement. 
 
With negotiated settlements, the regulatory burden is generally lower. The outcomes more 
closely reflect the needs of customers themselves. The scope for innovation is greater because 
there is no longer the same pressure for regulatory uniformity from one utility to another. 
Settlements would allow different approaches to be tried.  
 
These alternative approaches involve the regulator facilitating rather than replacing the 
market discovery process. If we had been aware of this idea in the early 1980s, I suspect we 
would have considered it an attractive way forward. Admittedly there was a need at that time 
to demonstrate a tangible form of regulation, and the requisite customer bodies were not then 
in existence. But with the benefit of experience here and overseas, and the emergence of 
customer bodies, we can now see the possibility of a more enlightened and effective form of 
utility regulation, better able to identify and protect the interests of customers, and operating 
with a lighter rein than the present one has turned out to have. The CAA has moved firmly in 
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this direction, but Ofgem and Ofwat have nominally rejected it while seeking to secure many 
of the benefits of the approach via a less committed process.  
 
Governments in the UK and elsewhere have the ability to encourage or discourage this 
potential next step in the development of utility regulation. For example, the Alberta Energy 
and Utilities Board Act 1995 (s132) provides that ‘‘the Board must recognize or establish 
rules, practices and procedures that facilitate negotiated settlement’’. This would be a useful 
encouragement for a regulatory approach that offers the prospect of better outcomes for 
customers and a less onerous process for all concerned. 
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